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Abstract
The optimal value computation for turned-based stochastic games with
reachability objectives, also known as simple stochastic games, is one of
the few problems in NP∩coNP which are not known to be in P. However,
there are some cases where these games can be easily solved, as for instance
when the underlying graph is acyclic. In this work, we try to extend this
tractability to several classes of games that can be thought as ”almost”
acyclic. We give some fixed-parameter tractable or polynomial algorithms
in terms of different parameters such as the number of cycles or the size
of the minimal feedback vertex set.
keywords: algorithmic game theory · stochastic games · FPT
algorithms
Introduction
A simple stochastic game, SSG for short, is a zero-sum, two-player, turn-based
version, of the more general stochastic games introduced by Shapley [17]. SSGs
were introduced by Condon [6] and they provide a simple framework that allows
to study the algorithmic complexity issues underlying reachability objectives.
A SSG is played by moving a pebble on a graph. Some vertices are divided
between players MIN and MAX: if the pebble attains a vertex controlled by a
player then he has to move the pebble along an arc leading to another vertex.
Some other vertices are ruled by chance; typically they have two outgoing arcs
and a fair coin is tossed to decide where the pebble will go. Finally, there is a
special vertex named the 1-sink, such that if the pebble reaches it player MAX
wins, otherwise player MIN wins.
Player MAX’s objective is, given a starting vertex for the pebble, to maxi-
mize the probability of winning against any strategy of MIN. One can show that
it is enough to consider stationary deterministic strategies for both players [6].
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Though seemingly simple since the number of stationary deterministic strate-
gies is finite, the task of finding the pair of optimal strategies, or equivalently,
of computing the so-called optimal values of vertices, is not known to be in P.
SSGs are closely related to other games such as parity games or discounted
payoff games to cite a few [2]. Interestingly, those games provide natural appli-
cations in model checking of the modal µ-calculus [18] or in economics. While it
is known that they can be reduced to simple stochastic games [4], hence seem-
ingly easier to solve, so far no polynomial algorithm are known for these games
either.
Nevertheless, there are some very simple restrictions for SSGs for which the
problem of finding optimal strategies is tractable. Firstly, if there is only one
player, the game is reduced to a Markov Decision Process (MDP) which can be
solved by linear programming. In the same vein, if there is no randomness, the
game can be solved in almost linear time [1].
As an extension of that fact, there is a Fixed Parameter Tractable (FPT)
algorithm, where the parameter is the number of average vertices [11]. The
idea is to get rid of the average vertices by sorting them according to a guessed
order. Finally, when the (graph underlying the) game is a directed acyclic graph
(DAG), the values can be found in linear time by computing them backwardly
from sinks.
Without the previous restrictions, algorithms running in exponential time
are known. Among them, the Hoffman-Karp [13] algorithm proceeds by suc-
cessively playing a local best-response named switch for one player, and then a
global best-response for the other player. Generalizations of this algorithm have
been proposed and, though efficient in practice, they fail to run in polynomial
time on a well designed example [9], even in the simple case of MDPs [8]. These
variations mainly concern the choice of vertices to switch at each turn of the al-
gorithm which is quite similar to the choice of pivoting in the simplex algorithm
for linear programming. This is not so surprising since computing the values of
an SSG can be seen as a generalization of solving a linear program. The best
algorithm so far is a randomized sub-exponential algorithm [15] that is based
on an adaptation of a pivoting rule used for the simplex.
Our contribution
In this article, we present several graph parameters such that, when the pa-
rameter is fixed, there is a polynomial time algorithm to solve the SSG value
problem. More precisely, the parameters we look at will quantify how close to a
DAG is the underlying graph of the SSG, a case that is solvable in linear time.
The most natural parameters that quantify the distance to a DAG would be
one of the directed versions of the tree-width such as the DAG-width. Unfortu-
nately, we are not yet able to prove a result even for SSG of bounded pathwidth.
In fact, in the simpler case of parity games the best algorithms for DAG-width
and clique-width are polynomials but not even FPT [16, 3]. Thus we focus on
restrictions on the number of cycles and the size of a minimal feedback vertex
set.
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First, we introduce in Section 2 a new class of games, namely MAX-acyclic
games, which contains and generalizes the class of acyclic games. We show that
the standard Hoffman-Karp algorithm, also known as strategy iteration algo-
rithm, terminates in a linear number of steps for games in this class, yielding
a polynomial algorithm to compute optimal values and strategies. It is known
that, in the general case, this algorithm needs an exponential number of steps
to compute optimal strategies, even in the simple case of Markov Decision Pro-
cesses [8, 9].
Then, we extend in Section 3 this result to games with very few cycles, by
giving an FPT-algorithm where the parameter is the number of fork vertices
which bounds the number of cycles. To obtain a linear dependance in the total
number of vertices, we have to reduce our problem to several instances of acyclic
games since we cannot even rely on computing the values in a general game.
Finally, in Section 4, we provide an original method to “eliminate” vertices
in an SSG. We apply it to obtain a polynomial time algorithm for the value
problem on SSGs with a feedback vertex set of bounded size (Theorem 8).
1 Definitions and standard results
Simple stochastic games are turn-based stochastic games with reachability ob-
jectives involving two players named MAX and MIN. In the original version of
Condon [6], all vertices except sinks have outdegree exactly two, and there are
only two sinks, one with value 0 and another with value 1. Here, we allow more
than two sinks with general rational values, and more than an outdegree two
for positional vertices.
Definition 1 (SSG). A simple stochastic game (SSG) is defined by a directed
graph G = (V,A), together with a partition of the vertex set V in four parts
VMAX , VMIN , VAV E and VSINK . To every x ∈ VSINK corresponds a value
Val(x) which is a rational number in [0, 1]. Moreover, vertices of VAV E have
outdegree exactly 2, while sink vertices have outdegree 1 consisting of a single
loop on themselves.
In the article, we denote by nM , nm and na the size of VMAX , VMIN and
VAV E respectively and by n the size of V . The set of positional vertices, denoted
VPOS , is VPOS = VMAX ∪ VMIN . We now define strategies which we restrict
to be stationary and pure, which turns out to be sufficient for optimality. Such
strategies specify for each vertex of a player the choice of a neighbour.
Definition 2 (Strategy). A strategy for player MAX is a map σ from VMAX
to V such that
∀x ∈ VMAX , (x, σ(x)) ∈ A.
Strategies for player MIN are defined analogously and are usually denoted
by τ . We denote Σ and T the sets of strategies for players MAX and MIN
respectively.
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Definition 3 (play). A play is a sequence of vertices x0, x1, x2, . . . such that
for all t ≥ 0,
(xt, xt+1) ∈ A.
Such a play is consistent with strategies σ and τ , respectively for player MAX
and player MIN, if for all t ≥ 0,
xt ∈ VMAX ⇒ xt+1 = σ(xt)
and
xt ∈ VMIN ⇒ xt+1 = τ(xt).
A couple of strategies σ, τ and an initial vertex x0 ∈ V define recursively a
random play consistent with σ, τ by setting:
• if xt ∈ VMAX then xt+1 = σ(xt);
• if xt ∈ VMIN then xt+1 = τ(xt);
• if xt ∈ VSINK then xt+1 = xt;
• if xt ∈ VAV E , then xt+1 is one of the two neighbours of xt, the choice
being made by a fair coin, independently of all other random choices.
Hence, two strategies σ, τ , together with an initial vertex x0 define a measure
of probability Px0σ,τ on plays consistent with σ, τ . Note that if a play contains a
sink vertex x, then at every subsequent time the play stays in x. Such a play
is said to reach sink x. To every play x0, x1, . . . we associate a value which is
the value of the sink reached by the play if any, and 0 otherwise. This defines
a random variable X once two strategies are fixed. We are interested in the
expected value of this quantity, which we call the value of a vertex x ∈ V under
strategies σ, τ :
Valσ,τ (x) = E
x
σ,τ (X)
where Exσ,τ is the expected value under probability P
x
σ,τ . The goal of player
MAX is to maximize this (expected) value, and the best he can ensure against
a strategy τ is
Valτ (x) = max
σ∈Σ
Valσ,τ (x)
while against σ player MIN can ensure that the expected value is at most
Valσ(x) = min
τ∈T
Valσ,τ (x).
Finally, the value of a vertex x, is the common value
Val(x) = max
σ∈Σ
min
τ∈T
Valσ,τ (x) = min
τ∈T
max
σ∈Σ
Valσ,τ (x). (1)
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The fact that these two quantities are equal is nontrivial, and it can be found
for instance in [6]. A pair of strategies σ∗, τ∗ such that, for all vertices x,
Valσ∗,τ∗(x) = Val(x)
always exists and these strategies are said to be optimal strategies. It is polynomial-
time equivalent to compute optimal strategies or to compute the values of all
vertices in the game, since values can be obtained from strategies by solving a
linear system. Conversely if values are known, optimal strategies are given by
greedy choices in linear time (see [6] and Lemma 1). Hence, we shall simply
write ”solve the game” for these tasks.
We shall need the following notion:
Definition 4 (Stopping SSG). A SSG is said to be stopping if for every couple
of strategies all plays eventually reach a sink vertex with probability 1.
Condon [6] proved that every SSG G can be reduced in polynomial time into
a stopping SSG G′ whose size is quadratic in the size of G, and whose values
almost remain the same.
Theorem 1 (Optimality conditions, [6]). Let G be a stopping SSG. The vector
of values (Val(x))x∈V is the only vector w satisfying:
• for every x ∈ VMAX , w(x) = max{w(y) | (x, y) ∈ A};
• for every x ∈ VMIN , w(x) = min{w(y) | (x, y) ∈ A};
• for every x ∈ VAV E w(x) = 12w(x1)+ 12w(x2) where x1 and x2 are the two
neighbours of x;
• for every x ∈ VSINK , w(x) = Val(x).
If the underlying graph of an SSG is acyclic, then the game is stopping and
the previous local optimality conditions yield a very simple way to compute
values. Indeed, we can use backward propagation of values since all leaves are
sinks, and the values of sinks are known. We naturally call these games acyclic
SSGs.
Once a pair of strategies has been fixed, the previous theorem enables us
to see the values as solution of a system of linear equations. This yields the
following lemma, which is an improvement on a similar result in [6], where the
bound is 4n instead of 6
na
2 .
Lemma 1. Let G be an SSG with sinks having rational values of common
denominator q. Then under any pair of strategies σ, τ , the value Valσ,τ (x) of any
vertex x can be computed in time O(nωa ), where ω is the exponent of the matrix
multiplication, and na the number of average (binary) vertices. Moreover, the
value can be written as a rational number a
b
, with
0 ≤ a, b ≤ 6na2 × q.
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Proof. We sketch the proof since it is standard. First, one can easily compute
all vertices x such that
Valσ,τ (x) = 0.
Let Z be the set of these vertices. Then:
• all AVE vertices in Z have all their neighbours in Z;
• all MAX (resp. MIN) vertices x in Z are such that σ(x) (resp. τ(x)) is in
Z.
To compute Z, we can start with the set Z of all vertices except sinks with
positive value and iterate the following
• if Z contains an AVE vertex x with a neighbour out of Z, remove x from
Z;
• if Z contains a MAX (resp. MIN) vertex x with σ(x) (resp. τ(x)) out of
Z, remove x from Z.
This process will stabilize in at most n steps and compute the required set
Z. Once this is done, we can replace all vertices of Z by a sink with value
zero, obtaining a game G′ where under σ, τ , the values of all vertices will be
unchanged.
Consider now in G’ two corresponding strategies σ, τ (keeping the same
names to simplify) and a positional vertex x. Let x′ be the first non positional
vertex that can be reached from x under strategies σ, τ . Clearly, x′ is well
defined and
Valσ,τ (x) = Valσ,τ (x
′).
This shows that the possible values under σ, τ of all vertices are the values of
average and sink vertices. The same is true if one average vertex has its two
arcs towards the same vertex, thus we can forget those also. The value of an
average vertex being equal to the average value of its two neighbours, we see
that we can write a system
z = Az + b (2)
where
• z is the na-dimensional vector containing the values of average vertices
• A is a matrix where all lines have at most two 12 coefficients, the rest being
zeros
• b is a vector whose entries are of the form 0, pi2q or
pi+pj
2q , corresponding
to transitions from average vertices to sink vertices.
Since no vertices but sinks have value zero, it can be shown that this system
has a unique solution, i.e. matrix I − A is nonsingular, where I is the na-
dimensional identity matrix. We refer to [6] for details, the idea being that
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since in n− 1 steps there is a small probability of transition from any vertex of
G′ to a sink vertex, the sum of all coefficients on a line of An−1 is strictly less
than one, hence the convergence of
∑
k≥0
Ak = (I −A)−1.
Rewriting (2) as
2(I −A)z = 2b,
we can use Cramer’s rule to obtain that the value zv of an average vertex v is
zv =
detBv
det 2(I −A)
where Bv is the matrix 2(I − A) with the column corresponding to v replaced
by 2b. Hence by expanding the determinant we see that zv is of the form
1
det 2(I −A)
∑
w∈VAV E
±2bw det(2(I −A)v,w)
where 2(I −A)v,w is the matrix 2(I −A) where the line corresponding to v and
the column corresponding to w have been removed.
Since 2bw has either value 0,
pi
q
or
pi+pj
q
for some 1 ≤ i, j ≤ na, we can write
the value of zv as a fraction of integers
∑
w∈v ±2bwq · det(2(I −A)v,w)
det 2(I −A) · q
It remains to be seen, by Hadamard’s inequality, that since the nonzero entries
of 2(I −A) on a line are a 2 and at most two −1, we have
det 2(I −A) ≤ 6na2 ,
which concludes the proof.
The bound 6
na
2 is almost optimal. Indeed a caterpillar tree of n average
vertices connected to the 0 sink except the last one, which is connected to the
1 sink, has a value of 12
n
at the root. Note that the lemma is slightly more
general (rational values on sinks) and the bound a bit better (
√
6 instead of 4)
than what is usually found in the literature.
In all this paper, the complexity of the algorithms will be given in term of
number of arithmetic operations and comparisons on the values as it is custom-
ary. The numbers occurring in the algorithms are rationals of value at most
exponential in the number of vertices in the game, therefore the bit complexity
is increased by at most an almost linear factor.
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2 MAX-acyclic SSGs
In this section we define a class of SSG that generalize acyclic SSGs and still
have a polynomial-time algorithm solving the value problem.
A cycle of an SSG is an oriented cycle of the underlying graph.
Definition 5. We say that an SSG is MAX-acyclic (respectively MIN-acyclic)
if from any MAX vertex x (resp. MIN vertex), for all outgoing arcs a but one,
all plays going through a never reach x again.
Therefore this class contains the class of acyclic SSGs and we can see this
hypothesis as being a mild form of acyclicity. From now on, we will stick to
MAX-acyclic SSGs, but any result would be true for MIN-acyclic SSGs also.
There is a simple characterization of MAX-acyclicity in term of the structure of
the underlying graph.
Lemma 2. An SSG is MAX-acyclic if and only if every MAX vertex has at
most one outgoing arc in a cycle.
Let us specify the following notion.
Definition 6. We say that an SSG is strongly connected if the underlying
directed graph, once sinks are removed, is strongly connected.
Lemma 3. Let G be a MAX-acyclic, strongly connected SSG. Then for each
MAX x, all neighbours of x but one must be sinks.
Proof. Indeed, if x has two neighbours y and z which are not sinks, then by
strong connexity there are directed paths from y to x and from z to x. Hence,
both arcs xy and xz are on a cycle, contradicting the assumption of MAX-
acyclicity.
From now on, we will focus on computing the values of a strongly connected
MAX-acyclic SSG. Indeed, it easy to reduce the general case of a MAX-acyclic
SSG to strongly connected by computing the DAG of the strongly connected
components in linear time. We then only need to compute the values in each of
the components, beginning by the leaves.
We will show that the Hoffman-Karp algorithm [13, 7], when applied to a
strongly connected MAX-acyclic SSG, runs for at most a linear number of steps
before reaching an optimal solution. Let us remind the notion of switchability
in simple stochastic games. If σ is a strategy for MAX, then a MAX vertex x is
switchable for σ if there is an neighbour y of x such that Valσ(y) > Valσ(σ(x)).
Switching such a vertex x consists in considering the strategy σ′, equal to σ but
for σ′(x) = y.
For two vectors v and w, we note v ≥ w if the inequality holds component-
wise, and v > w if moreover at least one component is strictly larger.
Lemma 4 (See Lemma 3.5 in [19]). Let σ be a strategy for MAX and S be a
set of switchable vertices. Let σ′ be the strategy obtained when all vertices of S
are switched. Then
Valσ′ > Valσ.
8
Let us recall the Hoffman-Karp algorithm:
1. Let σ0 be any strategy for MAX and τ0 be a best response to σ0
2. while (σt, τt) is not optimal:
(a) let σt+1 be obtained from σt by switching one (or more) switchable
vertex
(b) let τt+1 be a best response to σt+1
The Hoffman-Karp algorithm computes a finite sequence (σt)0≤t≤T of strate-
gies for the MAX player such that
∀0 ≤ t ≤ T − 1, Valσt+1 > Valσt .
If any MAX vertex x in a strongly connected MAX-acyclic SSG has more
than one sink neighbour, say s1, s2, · · · sk, then these can be replaced by a single
sink neighbour s′ whose value is
Val(s′) := max
i=1..k
Val(si).
Hence, we can suppose that all MAX vertices in a strongly connected MAX-
acyclic SSG have degree two. For such a reduced game, we shall say that a
MAX vertex x is open for a strategy σ if σ(x) is the sink neighbour of x and
that x is closed otherwise.
Lemma 5. Let G be a strongly connected, MAX-acyclic SSG, where all MAX
vertices have degree 2. Then the Hoffman-Karp algorithm, starting from any
strategy σ0, halts in at most 2nM steps. Moreover, starting from the strategy
where every MAX vertex is open, the algorithm halts in at most nM steps. All
in all, the computation is polynomial in the size of the game.
Proof. We just observe that if a MAX vertex x is closed at time t , then it
remains so until the end of the computation. More precisely, if s := σt−1(x) is
a sink vertex, and y := σt(x) is not, then since x has been switched we must
have
Valσt(y) > Valσt(s).
For all subsequent times t′ > t, since strategies are improving we will have
Valσt′ (y) ≥ Valσt(y) > Valσt(s) = Valσt′ (s) = Val(s),
so that x will never be switchable again.
Thus starting from any strategy, if a MAX vertex is closed it cannot be
opened and closed again, and if it is open it can only be closed once.
Each step of the Hoffman-Karp algorithm requires to compute a best-response
for the MIN player. A best-response to any strategy can be simply computed
with a linear program with as many variables as vertices in the SSG, hence in
polynomial time. We will denote this complexity by O(nη); it is well known
that we can have η ≤ 4, for instance with Karmarkar’s algorithm.
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Theorem 2. A strongly connected MAX-acyclic SSG can be solved in time
O(nMn
η).
Before ending this part, let us note that in the case where the game is also
MIN-acyclic, one can compute directly a best response to a MAX strategy σ
without linear programming: starting with a MIN strategy τ0 where all MIN
vertices are open, close all MIN vertices x such that their neighbour has a value
strictly less than their sink. One obtains a strategy τ1 such that
Valσ,τ1 < Valσ,τ0,
and the same process can be repeated. By a similar argument than in the
previous proof, a closed MIN vertex will never be opened again, hence the
number of steps is at most the number of MIN vertices, and each step only
necessitates to compute the values, i.e. to solve a linear system (see Lemma 1).
Corollary 1. A strongly connected MAX and MIN-acyclic SSG can be solved
in time O(nMnmn
ω), where ω is the exponent of matrix multiplication.
3 SSG with few fork vertices
Work on this section has begun with Yannis Juglaret during his Master intern-
ship at PRiSM laboratory. Preliminary results about SSGs with one simple
cycle can be found in his report [14]. We shall here obtain fixed-parameter
tractable (FPT) algorithms in terms of parameters quantifying how far a graph
is from being MAX-acyclic and MIN-acyclic, in the sense of section 2. These
parameters are:
kp =
∑
x∈VPOS
(|{y : (x, y) ∈ A and is in a cycle}| − 1)
and
ka =
∑
x∈VAV E
(|{y : (x, y) ∈ A and is in a cycle}| − 1).
We say that an SSG is POS-acyclic (for positional acyclic) when it is both
MAX and MIN-acyclic. Clearly, parameter kp counts the number of edges vio-
lating this condition in the game. Similarly, we say that the game is AVE-acyclic
when average vertices have at most one outgoing arc in a cycle. We call fork
vertices, those vertices that have at least two outgoing arcs in a cycle. Since
averages vertices have only two neighbours, ka is the number of fork average
vertices.
Note that:
1. When kp = 0 (respectively ka = 0), the game is POS-acyclic (resp. AVE-
acyclic).
2. When ka = kp = 0, the strongly connected components of the game are
cycles. We study these games, which we call almost acyclic, in detail in
subsection 3.1.
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3. Finally, the number of simple cycles of the SSG is always less than kp+ka,
therefore getting an FTP algorithm in kp and ka immediately gives an FTP
algorithm in the number of cycles.
We obtain:
Theorem 3. There is an algorithm which solves the value problem for SSGs in
time O(nf(kp, ka)), with f(kp, ka) = ka!4
ka2kp.
As a corollary, by remark 3 above we have:
Theorem 4. There is an algorithm which solves the value problem for SSGs
with k simple cycles in time O(ng(k)) with g(k) = (k − 1)!4k−1.
Note that in both cases, when parameters are fixed, the dependance in n is
linear.
Before going further, let us explain how one could easily build on the previous
part and obtain an FPT algorithm in parameter kp, but with a much worse
dependance in n.
When kp > 0, one can fix partially a strategy on positional fork vertices,
hence obtaining a POS-acyclic subgame that can be solved in polynomial time
according to Corollary 1, using the Hoffman-Karp algorithm. Combining this
with a bruteforce approach looking exhaustively through all possible local choices
at positional fork vertices, we readily obtain a polynomial algorithm for the value
problem when kp is fixed:
Theorem 5. There is an algorithm to solve the value problem of an SSG in
time O(nMnmn
ω2kp).
We shall conserve this brute-force approach. In the following, we give an
algorithm that reduces the polynomial complexity to a linear complexity when
ka is fixed. From now on, up to applying the same bruteforce procedure, we
assume kp = 0 (all fork vertices are average vertices). We also consider the
case of a strongly connected SSG, since otherwise the problem can be solved for
each strongly connected component as done in Section 2. We begin with the
baseline ka = 0 and extend the algorithm to general values of ka. Before this,
we provide some preliminary lemmas and definitions that will be used in the
rest of the section.
A partial strategy is a strategy defined on a subset of vertices controlled by
the player. Let σ be such a partial strategy for player MAX, we denote by G[σ]
the subgame of G where the set of strategies of MAX is reduced to the ones
that coincide with σ on its support. According to equation (1), the value of an
SSG is the highest expected value that MAX can guarantee, then it decreases
with the set of actions of MAX:
Lemma 6. Let G be an SSG with value v, σ a partial strategy of MAX, and
G[σ] the subgame induced by σ with value v′. Then v ≥ v′.
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In strongly connected POS-acyclic games, positional vertices have at least
one outgoing arc to a sink. Recall that, in case the strategy chooses a sink, we
say that it is open at this vertex (the strategy is said open if it is open at a
vertex), and closed otherwise. We can then compare the value of an SSG with
that of the subgame generated by any open strategy.
Lemma 7. Let x be a MAX vertex of an SSG G with a sink neighbour, and σ
the partial strategy open at x. If it is optimal to open x in G, then it is optimal
to open it in G[σ].
Proof. Since it is optimal to open x in G, the value of its neighbour sink is at
least that of any neighbour vertex, say y. But, in view of Lemma 6, the value
of y in G[σ] is smaller than in G, and then it is again optimal to play a strategy
open at x in the subgame.
This lemma allows to reduce an almost acyclic SSG (resp. an SSG with
parameter ka > 0) to an acyclic SSG (resp. an SSG with parameter ka − 1).
Indeed, if the optimal MAX strategy is open at vertex x, then the optimal
strategy of the subgame open at any MAX vertex will be open at x. A solution
to find x once the subgame is solved (and then to reduce the parameter ka)
consists in testing all the open MAX vertices. But it may be the case that all
MAX vertices are open which would not yield a FPT algorithm. In Lemma 8
(resp. Lemma 9), we give a restriction on the set of MAX vertices that has to
be tested when ka = 0 (resp. ka > 0) which provides an FPT algorithm.
3.1 Almost acyclic SSGs
We consider an SSG with ka = 0. Together with the hypothesis that it is POS-
acyclic and strongly connected, its graph, once sinks are removed, consists of a
single cycle. A naive algorithm to compute the value of such SSG consists in
looking for, if it exists, a vertex that is open in the optimal strategy, and then
solve the acyclic subgame:
1. For each positional vertex x:
(a) compute the values of the acyclic SSG G[σ], where σ is the partial
strategy open at x,
(b) if the local optimality condition is satisfied for x in G, return the
values.
2. If optimal strategies have not been found, return the value when all vertices
are closed.
This naive algorithm uses the routine that computes the value of an SSG with
only one cycle. When the strategies are closed, the values can be computed in
linear time as for an acyclic game. Indeed, let x be an average vertex (if none,
the game can be solved in linear time) and s1 . . . sℓ be the values of the average
neighbour sinks in the order given by a walk on the cycle starting from x. Then
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the value of x satisfies the equation Val(x) = 12s1 +
1
2 (
1
2s2 +
1
2 (· · · + 12 (12sℓ +
1
2Val(x)))), so that
Val(x) =
2ℓ
2ℓ − 1
ℓ∑
i=1
2−isi, (3)
which can be computed in time linear in the size of the cycle. The value of the
other vertices can be computed by walking backward from x, again in linear
time. Finally, since solving an acyclic SSG is linear, the complexity of the algo-
rithm is O(n2) which is still better than the complexity O(nMnmn
ω) obtained
with the Hoffman-Karp algorithm (see Theorem 5).
Remark that this algorithm can readily be extended to a SSG with k cycles
with a complexity O(nk+1). Hence it is not an FPT algorithm for the number
of cycles. However, we can improve on this naive algorithm by noting that the
optimal strategy belongs to one of the following subclasses of strategies:
(i) strategies closed everywhere,
(ii) strategies open at least at one MAX vertex,
(iii) strategies open at least at one MIN vertex.
The trick of the algorithm is that, knowing which of the three classes the optimal
strategy belongs to, the game can be solved in linear time. Indeed:
(i) If the optimal strategy is closed at every vertex, the value can be computed
in linear time as shown before.
(ii) If the optimal strategy is open at a MAX vertex (the MIN case is similar),
then it suffices to solve in linear time the acyclic game G[σ] where σ is
any partial strategy open at a MAX vertex, and then use the following
Lemma to find an open vertex for the optimal strategy of the initial game.
Lemma 8. Let G be a strongly connected almost-acyclic SSG. Assume that the
optimal strategy is open at a MAX vertex. For any partial strategy σ open at
a MAX vertex x, let x = x0, x1 . . . xℓ = x be the sequence of the ℓ open MAX
vertices for the optimal strategy of G[σ] listed in the cycle order. Then it is
optimal to open x1.
Proof. Let x¯ be a MAX vertex that is open when solving G. From Lemma 7,
there is an index i such that xi = x¯ (in particular there exists an open MAX
vertex when solving G[σ]). If ℓ = 1 then x0 = x¯ so that the optimal strategies
of G[σ] and G coincide. Otherwise, if i = 1, the result is immediate. At last,
if i > 1, xi has the same value in G and G[σ] (the value of its sink), and so
has the vertex just before if it is different from x0. Going backward from xi in
the cycle, all the vertices until x0 (not included) have the same value in G and
G[σ]. In particular, if i > 1, this is the case for x1 whose value is then the value
of its sink. So it is optimal to open x1 in G as well.
All in all, a linear algorithm that solves a strongly connected almost-acyclic
SSG G is:
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1. Compute the values of the strategies closed everywhere. If optimal, return
the values.
2. Else compute the optimal strategies of G[σ1] where σ1 is a partial strategy
open at a MAX vertex x; let y be the first open MAX vertex after x;
compute the values of G[σ2] where σ2 is the partial strategy open at y; if
the local optimality condition is satisfied for y in G, return the values.
3. Else apply the same procedure to any MIN vertex.
Theorem 6. There is an algorithm to solve the value problem of a strongly
connected almost-acyclic SSG in time O(n) with n the number of vertices.
3.2 Fixed number of non acyclic average vertices
Again, we assume that the SSG is strongly connected and POS-acyclic. The
algorithm for almost-acyclic games can be generalized as follow.
Firstly, it is possible to compute the values of the strategies closed every-
where in polynomial time in ka and check if this strategy is optimal. Indeed the
value of each fork vertex can be expressed as an affine function of the value of
all fork vertices in the spirit of Eq. (3). Then the linear system of size ka can be
solved in polynomial time, and the value of the remaining vertices computed by
going backward from each fork vertex. This shows that computing the values
of a game once strategies are fixed is polynomial in the number of fork average
vertices, which slightly improves the complexity of Lemma 1.
Otherwise, the following Lemma allows to find a positional vertex that is
open for the optimal strategy. We say that a vertex x is the last (resp. first)
vertex in a set S before (resp. after) another vertex y if there is a unique simple
path from x to y (resp. y to x) that does not contain any vertex in S, x and y
being excluded.
Lemma 9. Let G be a strongly connected SSG with a set A = {a1, . . . , aℓ} of
fork average vertices and no positional fork vertices. Assume that the optimal
strategy of G is open at a MAX vertex. Let σ be a partial strategy open at any
vertex that is the last MAX vertex before a vertex in A. Let S[σ] be the set of
open MAX vertices when solving G[σ]. Then, there exists x ∈ S[σ] that satisfies
• it is optimal to open x in G,
• x is the first vertex in S[σ] after a vertex in A.
Proof. Let x¯ be a MAX vertex that is open when solving G, and i be such
that ai is the last vertex in A before x¯. By Lemma 7, x¯ is open in G[σ] and
since σ is not open at a MAX vertex between ai and x¯, all the vertices between
the successor of ai and x¯ have the same value in G[σ] and G, and then the
optimal strategy of G[σ] at these vertices is optimal for G. This property holds
in particular for the first vertex in S[σ] after ai in the path leading to x¯.
14
max1 . . . maxk
s1 . . . sk
a1 a2. . .
Figure 1: Illustration of Lemma 9: a1 and a2 are average fork vertices. Vertices
on the top are MAX vertices, labelled from 1 to k, that lead to sinks. maxk is
the last MAX vertex before a fork vertex. Assume it is optimal to open at least
one MAX vertex. Then, the first open MAX vertex (wrt to the labelling) of the
optimal strategy of the subgame open at maxk is open as well in the optimal
strategy of the initial game.
The Lemma is illustrated on Figure 1.
Finally, if the optimal strategy is open at some MAX vertex, then the fol-
lowing algorithm can be run to compute the values of G:
1. Let x be the last MAX vertex before some fork vertex, and σ1 the partial
strategy open at x. G[σ1] is an SSG that has ka − 1 fork vertices (recall
that G is strongly connected). When solved, it provides a set S[σ1] of
open MAX vertices. There are at most ka + ka − 1 vertices that are the
first in S[σ1] after a fork vertex. Then, from Lemma 9, it is optimal to
open at least one of them in G.
2. For each y that is the first in S[σ1] after a fork vertex:
(a) compute the values of G[σ2], σ2 being the partial strategy open at y,
(b) if local optimality condition is satisfied for y in G, return the values.
This algorithm computes at most 2ka SSGs with ka−1 average fork vertices.
In the worst case, the same algorithm must be run for the MIN vertices. Using
theorem 6 for the case kp = ka = 0, we obtain Theorem 3 and its corollary.
4 Feedback vertex set
A feedback vertex set is a set of vertices in a directed graph such that removing
them yields a DAG. Computing a minimal vertex set is an NP-hard problem [10],
but it can be solved with a FPT algorithm [5]. Assume the size of the minimal
vertex set is fixed, we prove in this section that we can find the optimal strategies
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in polynomial time. Remark that, to prove such a theorem, we cannot use the
result on bounded number of cycles since a DAG plus one vertex may have an
exponential number of cycles. Moreover a DAG plus one vertex may have a
large number of positional vertices with several arcs in a cycle, thus we cannot
use the algorithm to solve MAX-acyclic plus a few non acyclic MAX vertices.
The method we present works by transforming k vertices into sinks and could
thus be used for other classes of SSGs. For instance, it could solve in polynomial
time the value problem for games which are MAX-acyclic when k vertices are
removed.
4.1 The dichotomy method
We assume from now on that all SSGs are stopping. In this subsection, we
explain how to solve an SSG by solving it several times but with one vertex less.
First we remark that turning any vertex into a sink of its own value in the
original game does not change any value.
Lemma 10. Let G be an SSG and x one of its vertex. Let G′ be the same SSG
as G except that x has been turned into a sink vertex of value ValG(x). For all
vertices y, ValG(y) = ValG′(y).
Proof. The optimality condition of Theorem 1 are exactly the same in G and
G′. Since the game is stopping, there is one and only one solution to these
equations and thus the values of the vertices are identical in both games.
The values in an SSG are monotone with regards to the values of the sinks,
as proved in the next lemma.
Lemma 11. Let G be an SSG and s one of its sink vertex. Let G′ be the same
SSG as G except that the value of s has been increased. For all vertices x,
ValG(x) ≤ ValG′(x).
Proof. Let fix a pair of strategy (σ, τ) and a vertex x. We have:
Val(σ,τ),G(x) =
∑
y∈VSINK
P (x y)ValG(y)
Val(σ,τ),G(x) ≤
∑
y∈VSINK
P (x y)ValG′(y) = Val(σ,τ),G′(x)
because ValG(x) = ValG′(x) except when x = s, ValG(s) ≤ ValG′(s). Since
the inequality is true for every pair of strategies and every vertex, the lemma is
proved.
Let x be an arbitrary vertex of G and let G[v] be the same SSG, except that
x becomes a SINK vertex of value v. We define the function f by:


if x is a MAX vertex, f(v) = max{ValG[v](y) : (x, y) ∈ A}
if x is a MIN vertex, f(v) = min{ValG[v](y) : (x, y) ∈ A}
if x is an AVE vertex, f(v) = 12ValG[v](x
1) + ValG[v](x
2)
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Lemma 12. There is a unique v0 such that f(v0) = v0 which is v0 = ValG(x).
Moreover, for all v > v0, f(v0) < v0 and for all v < v0, f(v0) > v0.
Proof. The local optimality conditions given in Theorem 1 are the same in G and
G[v] except the equation f(ValG(x)) = ValG(x). Therefore, when f(v0) = v0,
the values of G[v] satisfy all the local optimality conditions of G. Thus v0 is the
value of s in G. Since the game is stopping there is at most one such value.
Conversely, let v0 be the value of s in G. By Lemma 10, the values in G[v0]
are the same as in G for all vertices. Therefore the local optimality conditions
in G contains the equation f(v0) = v0.
We have seen that f(v) = v is true for exactly one value of v. Since the
function f is increasing by Lemma 11 and because f(0) ≥ 0 and f(1) ≤ 1, we
have for all v > v0, f(v0) < v0 and for all v < v0, f(v0) > v0.
The previous lemma allows to determine the value of x in G by a dichotomic
search by the following algorithm. We keep refining an interval [min,max]
which contains the value of x, with starting values min = 0 and max = 1.
1. While max−min ≤ 6−na do:
(a) v = (min+max)/2
(b) Compute the values of G[v]
(c) If f(v) > v then min = v
(d) If f(v) < v then max = v
2. Return the unique rational in [min,max] of denominator less than 6−
na
2
Theorem 7. Let G be an SSG with n vertices and x one of its vertex. Denote by
C(n) the complexity to solve G[v], then we can compute the values of G in time
O(nC(n)). In particular an SSG which can be turned into a DAG by removing
one vertex can be solved in time O(n2).
Proof. Let v0 be the value of x in G, which exists since the game is stopping.
By Lemma 12 it is clear that the previous algorithm is such that v0 is in the
interval [min,max] at any time. Moreover, by Lemma 1 we know that v0 =
a
b
where b ≤ 6na2 . At the end of the algorithm, max−min ≤ 6−na therefore there
is at most one rational of denominator less than 6
na
2 in this interval. It can be
found exactly with O(na) arithmetic operations by doing a binary search in the
Stern-Brocot tree (see for instance [12]).
One last call to G[v0] gives us all the exact values of G. Since the algorithm
stops when max −min ≤ 6−na , we have at most O(na) calls to the algorithm
solving G[v]. All in all the complexity is O(naC(n) + na) that is O(naC(n)).
In the case where G[v] is an acyclic graph, we can solve it in linear time
which gives us the stated complexity.
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4.2 Feedback Vertex Set of Fixed Size
Let G be an SSG such that X is one of its minimal vertex feedback set. Let
k = |X |. The game is assumed to be stopping. Since the classical transfor-
mation [6] into a stopping game does not change the size of a minimal vertex
feedback set, it will not change the polynomiality of the described algorithm.
However the transformation produces an SSG which is quadratically larger, thus
a good way to improve the algorithm we present would be to relax the stopping
assumption.
In this subsection we will consider games whose sinks have dyadic values,
since they come from the dichotomy of the last subsection. The gcd of the
values of the sinks will thus be the maximum of the denominators. The idea
to solve G is to get rid of X , one vertex at a time by the previous technique.
The only thing we have to be careful about is the precision up to which we have
to do the dichotomy, since each step adds a new sink whose value has a larger
denominator.
Theorem 8. There is an algorithm which solves any stopping SSG in time
O(nk+1) where n is the number of vertices and k the size of the minimal feedback
vertex set.
Proof. First recall that we can find a minimal vertex with an FPT algorithm.
You can also check every set of size k and test in linear time whether it is a
feedback vertex set. Thus the complexity of finding such a set, that we denote
by X = {x1, . . . , xk}, is at worst O(nk+1). Let denote by Gi the game G where
x1 to xi has been turned into sinks of some values. If we want to make these
values explicit we write Gi[v1, . . . , vi] where v1 to vi are the values of the sinks.
We now use the algorithm of Theorem 7 recursively, that is we apply it to re-
duce the problem of solving Gi[v1, . . . , vi] to the problem of solving Gi+1[v1, . . . ,
vi, vi+1] for several values of vi+1. Since Gk is acyclic, it can be solved in linear
time. Therefore the only thing we have to evaluate is the number of calls to this
last step. To do that we have to explain how precise should be the dichotomy
to solve Gi, which will give us the number of calls to solve Gi in function of the
number of calls to solve Gi+1.
We prove by induction on i that the algorithm, to solve Gi, makes log(pi)
calls to solve Gi+1, where the value vi+1 is a dyadic number of numerator
bounded by pi = 6
(2i+1−1)na . Theorem 7 proves the case i = 0. Assume the
property is proved for i − 1, we prove it for i. By induction hypothesis, all the
denominators of v1, . . . , vi are power of two and their gcd is bounded by pi. By
Lemma 1, the value of xi is a rational of the form
a
b
where b ≤ pi6na2 . We have
to do the dichotomy up to the square of pi6
na
2 to recover the exact value of
xi in the game Gi(v1, . . . , vi−1). Thus the bound on the denominator of vi+1
is pi+1 = p
2
i 6
na . That is pi+1 = 6
2(2i+1−1)na6na = 6(2
i+2−1)na , which proves
the induction hypothesis. Since we do a dichotomy up to a precision pi+1, the
number of calls is clearly log(pi+1).
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In conclusion, the number of calls to Gk is
k−1∏
i=0
log(6(2
i+1−1)na) ≤ 2k2 log(6)knka.
Since solving a game Gk can be done in linear time the total complexity is in
O(nk+1).
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